Search results for "public choice"
showing 10 items of 14 documents
The Role the Static Maximization Approach Plays in Neoclassical Analyses
1994
This is an article on the methodology of economic thought. The critical assessment of the neoclassical research programme contained here basically comes from the contributions of J.M. Buchanan, Nobel prize winner in Economics 1986. These comments are aimed at pointing out the role that the static maximization approach plays in neoclassical analyses since L. Robbins and P. Samuelson’s influential contributions came about after World War II. Just to complement this basic purpose, I present in section 4 the alternative methodological foundations J.M. Buchanan proposes and uses to replace the static maximization approach when building public choice analyses and I sketch in section 5 several pe…
Reforms and decentralization: friends or foes
2013
Systemic concerns about markets, capitalism and the role of the state in the economy are salient again. Relatively large-scale reforms of economic and social arrangements are seriously considered. Historical experience suggests that reforms of that kind are sometimes associated with important changes in institutional arrangements pertaining to political decentralization. To explore the relationship between economic reforms and decentralization, the paper argues that a reform has two dimensions. It is a process and it is a design. The organization of the paper is inspired by that distinction. For economists, it seems natural to reason in terms of design -- that is, to perceive reform as the …
Political Yardstick Competition and Corporate Governance in the European Union
2006
http://www.dur.ac.uk/john.ashworth/EPCS/Papers_and_Authors.php; The question whether regulatory competition in the area of company law could take place in the European Union (EU) in a way similar to the form it takes in the United States (the Delaware phenomenon) is topical because of some recent judgments of the European Court of Justice (Centros) and documents and projects produced by the European Commission. That question is typically discussed, however, as if voters did not count and as if competition among governments was exclusively based on the mobility of firms across jurisdictions. But intergovernmental competition can also take the form of yardstick, or relative performance, compe…
An evolutionary model of voting
2001
Collective allocation of resources that takes place in po- litical markets is characterized by the complex exchange that emerges among the individuals involved. Traditional Public Choice models de- part from individual rational choice in a setup in which many of its strict requirements need not hold. This paper introduces a model of social interaction among agents in a simple political market which de- parts from bounded rationality and evolutionary dynamics as the key mechanisms that drive individual behavior. Learning plays a signicant role as it allows to establish an individual link between decisions and collective outcomes. The model is that of a representative democracy with two parti…
Decentralization and growth: what if the cross-jurisdiction approach had met a dead end?
2013
International audience; The relationship between decentralization and economic growth is generally studied from a perspective stressing universal or quasi-universal regularities across jurisdictions. That approach has generated many insights but seems to reach its limits. The paper explains why it allows contrasting positions with regard to the benefits of decentralization even among proponents of free and competitive markets. And it seems from the empirical literature that no robust and economically significant cross-jurisdiction relation between decentralization and economic performance or growth, except perhaps their independence, has been found. The absence of a relation valid across ju…
Public choice of urban water service management: a multi-criteria approach
2013
Local policy makers in developed countries have to make decisions in increasingly complex scenarios. Consequently, they should use all the tools available when deciding which management option is the most suitable for urban water service, given how important that service is and the variety of criteria involved in making such a decision. This article employs ‘analytic hierarchy process’ techniques to perform an ex post analysis of the decision to transfer the management of the urban water service in Granada (in southern Spain) to a public-private partnership. The main conclusion is that the decision was rational, in that it was the best possible alternative considering the hierarchy of prefe…
How significant is yardstick competition among governments? Three reasons to dig deeper
2013
22 pages; The significance of yardstick competition among governments is now confirmed with regard to fiscal variables. This is an important result but the significance of the mechanism must also be sought in a context broader than that of fiscal federalism and without limitation to relations and processes fully observable. Three points are made. Even in the case of governments trying to mimic each other over a single variable, additional variables are involved in an important way. Yardstick competition can be latent without being ineffective. Its major effect, then, is to set bounds to the choices that office-holders could think of making. Finally, the mechanism is a hidden albeit essentia…
Institutional Arrangements Matter for Both Efficiency and Distribution: Contributions and Challenges of the New Institutional Economics
2011
Are scholars in the New Institutional Economics tradition systematically disregarding distributive aspects when approaching policy issues as was the case during the 1970s and 1980s? Do economic and political agents usually care about distribution too? To provide an answer to these questions is the basic purpose of this chapter. The analysis carried out demonstrates that not all NIE oriented scholars disregard distributive issues. Some contributions are examined as examples, mainly in the so-called political economy branch of NIE. By means of a well-known graphical tool, the chapter also emphasizes that all of us clearly care about distribution, not just about efficiency, when participating …
Recension de Daniel Treisman, The Architecture of Government: Rethinking Political Decentralization
2010
Public Choice, vol. 142(1-2);